Backgrounds and related work
In this section we provide an overview of cost sensitive learning and define cloning, fraud and counterfeiting problems. We define both RFID tag detection classification and cost matrices. Finally, we explain how we could integrate RFID detection and our cost model in our proposed seven-layer trust framework. Cost-Sensitive Learning is a type of learning in data mining that takes misclassification and other types of cost into consideration (Turney, 2002) . The goal of this type of learning is to minimise total cost. The key difference between cost-sensitive learning and cost-insensitive learning is that cost-sensitive learning treats different misclassifications differently (Turney, 2002) . Cost insensitive learning does not take misclassification costs into consideration. The goal of this type of learning is to pursue high accuracy when classifying examples into a set of known classes.
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Credit card fraud detection, cellular phone fraud detection and medical diagnoses are examples of intrusion detection because intrusion detections deal with detecting abnormal behaviour and are typically motivated by cost-saving, and thus typically use cost-sensitive modeling techniques. Previous work in the domains of credit card fraud (Lee, W., et.al, 1999) and cellular phone fraud (Fawcett & Provost, 1997) have applied cost metrics in evaluating systems and alternative models, and in formalizing the problems to which one may wish to apply data mining technologies. The cost model approach proposed by Lee et.al (2000) formulate the total expected cost of an IDS, and present cost-sensitive machine learning techniques that can produce detection models that are optimized for user-defined cost metrics. The detection technique used by Fan et.al (2000) and Lee et.al (2002) uses an inductive rule learner, Repeated Incremental Pruning to Produce Error Reduction (RIPPER). Their cost model is based on a combination of several factors: The cost of detecting the intrusion; the amount of damage caused by the attack; and the operational cost of the reaction to the intrusion. Lee et al (2002) claimed that the IDS should have minimal costs. However, their work did not consider any related administrative testing costs. Their work has been extended by Chen et.al (2008) , who claimed that their approach could potentially lower the consequential cost in current IDSs. Although the generation of fingerprints as a means of authentication increases operational costs associated with the use of IDSs, experimental results show that these incremental costs are limited and that overall cost is much lower than with the Lee et.al (2002) approach. We adopted the two proposed models above. Since our cloned detector will become a component integrated in the existing Global Electronic Product Code (EPCglobal) Standard, we should be able to use the cost model designed for IDS. Differences include the technique used to quantify the cost model and the detection technique and authentication method used in our cloned detector. We analyse various authentication methods used for supply chain partners and RFID tags by using the MCDM approach. Next, we define cloning, fraud and counterfeiting attacks in a RFID system.
Problem definition 2.1.1 Cloning, fraud and counterfeiting definition
RFID tags clone occurs in the form of cloned tags on fake products or clone tags on genuine product. Both types are similar in term of the cloned tags.
• An RFID tag is a cloned when the tag identification number (TID) and the form factors is copied to an empty tags (Lehtonen et.al, 2009) . Hence there will be a same tags data structure on two different products.
•
In contrast, fraud is an act of using the cloned tags and adding the serial numbers of future EPC codes. These future EPC codes are the codes in the systems, which are yet to be tagged to the products.
Counterfeiting on the other hand is a more generalised term which includes both the act of cloning and fraud of RFID tags and tagging onto fake products in the market for personal benefit. There are four different attacks that contribute to cloning attack in a RFID system (Mahinderjit-Singh & Li, 2009; Mahinderjit-Singh & Li 2010) . Skimming attack occur when RFID tag are read directly without anyone knowledge. Eavesdropping attack happens when an attacker sniffs the transmission between the tag and reader to capture tags data. On the other hand, man in the middle attack occurs when a fake reader is used to trick the genuine tags and readers during data transmission. RFID tag data could also be altered using this www.intechopen.com technique and as a result, fraud tags could be generated too. Physical attack which requires expertise and expensive equipment takes places in laboratory on expensive RFID tags and security embedded tags. We will give a definition of clone, fraud and counterfeiting in RFID tag. Let assume set Ti contain the RFID genuine tags and Tx contain cloned tags derived from Ti. A genuine tag is known as TG and a cloned tag is known as TC. I denote an intruder. A list of attacks (S) includes Skimming (S1), Sniffing (S2), Active Attack (S3), Reverse Engineering (S4) and Cryptanalysis (S5) Thus; Ti= {TG1, TG2, TG3} Tx= {TC1, TC2} S = {S1, S2, S3, S4, S5}. (Juel.A,2005 ) (Dimitriou,2005) Copy Cloned Low ( Tag, Reader) Content Timestamp/TTL R/W on Tag & Reader Eavesdrop (Bolotnyy et.al, 2007 ) (Duc & Park, 2006) Copy Cloned Low ( Tag, Reader, DB)
Attack Types Attack Pattern Attack Levels Model features Skim
Content Timestamp/TTL R/W on Tag & Reader Location
Man-InThe middle (Juels, 2006) (Gao et.al, 2007) Copy Hence TC1 is a clone of TG1; if and only if both tags have identical TIDs (tag identifier) and share the same form of characteristics. Once the TIDs are the same, all the data and structure of the tag's EPC code such as header, manufacturer id, object class and serial number are identical, i.e., |TG| = |TC|. A TC exists when I performs S either a single S or a combinations of S against TG. S will produce cloning attack. RFID Cloning is a process of injecting imitated EPC tags in a normal genuine EPC tags batch TG ⊆ BG and TC ⊆ BC. Table 1 shows RFID attacks patterns and its model. By analysing the model features of the different attacks types, we can distinguish different types of RFID security attacks, different levels of attack (high, low) and the different associated compromised RFID components. This model is important for the precise understanding of cloning vs. fraud attacks. A cloning attack is generalised as an act of copying tag data and structure, whereas a fraud attack involves both copying and altering tag data and structure. Based on Table 1 , RFID tags compromised by 'Eavesdropping', 'Man in the middle' and 'Physical' attacks will demonstrate deviants in RFID tag data and structure namely tag content tag time ( e.g. timestamp and time to live (TTL) ( Li et.al, 2009) www.intechopen.com Supply Chain Management 206 and tag locality. Next, we define RFID tag cloning and fraud detection classification and a cost sensitive model that can be used for RFID tagging.
RFID tag cloning and fraud detection classification and cost sensitive modeling
Before applying a cost sensitive model to RFID tagging, a RFID dataset is pre-processed to feed into a cloned detector that is based on a classification concept. Suppose that we have a collection, I, of RFID Tags, each labelled as either good or bad, depending on whether or not it is associated with legitimate or fake products. The set of all possible classes can thus be defined as C = {good, bad}. Bad tags could be either cloned or fraudulent/fake tags. We approximate the unknown target function, F: I × C = {1, 0}. The value of f(i, c) is equal to one if the RFID tag, i, belongs to the class c and equal to zero if not. It is now possible to define a classifier as an approximation function, M: I ×C = {1, 0}. The objective of the learning task is to generate a classifier that produces results as close to that of F as possible. Compute a model or classifier, C, by some learning algorithm L that is predicted from the features:
<fn,……fn-1>
The target class label is fc, 'cloned' . Hence, C = L(T), where L is a learning algorithm . Each t Є T is a vector of features, where we denote f1 as the 'transaction amount' (tranamt), and fn as the target class label, where the denoted clone (t) = 0 (legitimate transaction) or 1 (cloned or fraudulent transaction). Given a 'new unseen' transaction, x, with an unknown class label, we compute fn(x) = C(x). C serves as a clone detector. Within the context of financial transactions, cost is naturally measured in dollars (e.g. US dollar is used in his chapter). However, any unit of measure of utility applies here. Hence, the cost model for this domain is based on the sum and average of loss caused by cloned and fraudulent tags. We define a set of transactions S, a fixed overhead amount, and a cloned detector C (or classifier, C). The overhead amount is the cost of running the IDS operation. The total potential loss is the transaction amount (tranamt) losses for both cloning and fraudulent transactions. The cost matrix outcomes such as FN, FP, hit and true negative (TN) is as shown in Table 2 and is used for distinguishing whether the cost is a 'tranamt' (t) or an overhead. Table 2 . Prediction of Cost model using tranmt (t) and overhead
Trust framework and IDS
The deviation of RFID technology based trust takes places when simple soft trust (including experience and reputation) is taken up to a higher level known as hybrid trust. Hybrid trust in a RFID system is more than just a hard or security trust based on authentication of soft www.intechopen.com trust as argued by Lin and Varadharajan (2007) . In our definition, trust in a RFID technology system is defined as a comprehensive decision making instrument that joins security elements in detecting security threats with preventing attacks through the use of basic and extended security techniques such as cryptography and human interaction with reputation models. Since a trust model that disperses privacy is a weak and non-usable model, our trust framework ensures privacy and does not compromise security measurements. In addition, we argue that a trust model for a technological system should always include human interaction through the use of a feedback and ranking model. Our trust framework provides a theoretical solution for the trust gaps discussed in Section 1. In addition, our proposed trust framework ( Figure 1 ) functions as :
• a solution to optimising trustworthiness by employing core functions at three main levels: a. The RFID system physical level (i.e. tags and readers) security and privacy level core functions; b. The RFID service core functions at the middleware level through utilisation of multiple data integration platforms such as the EPC trust services (http://www.epcglobalinc.org ) and third party software systems such as intrusion detection systems (IDS) which can also be used; and c. The core functions at application level through use of reputation systems based on user interaction experiences and beliefs and www.intechopen.com
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• to provide guidelines for designing trust in solving open system security threats.
EPCglobal network
EPCglobal (http://www.epcglobalinc.org), a subsidiary of GS1, has used EPC naming conventions to identify and trace products movement using RFID technology . This application is named the EPCglobal Network. The EPCglobal Network introduces a few dedicated components, such as the Object Naming Service (ONS) and the EPC Information Services (EPCIS) that may or may not be needed for future applications (Ranasinghe et.al, 2007) . The ONS functions as an EPC resolution service that provides a look up a service to resources that provide further information about an item identified by a particular EPC. The ONS uses the standard Domain Name Service (DNS) for resolving EPCs. EPCIS permit applications to share and use EPC data across different enterprises. In each application, each local company will have its own local database and local EPC-IS. In addition, a Discovery Service (DS) (still under development) is a registry which registers incoming and outgoing products (Ranasinghe. and Cole, 2007) and functions as a item-level tagging server.
Architecture of our cost based cloned detector
In this section we design a cost based RFID tag cloning detector into our proposed trust framework and into the EPCglobal service. Figure 2 gives an outline on how our proposed detection system will work in a supply chain environment and in an EPCglobal network.
The following is a list of assumptions used in our system: 1. By utilising our proposed seven-layer trust framework, detection functions take place in layer-4. 2. Our trust framework is placed in EPCglobal services. 3. Local EPC-IS only share information that can be assessed by all assigned supply chain partners. Distributed network architecture is employed. Distributed network architecture eliminates the problem of information overload and makes it easier to exchange information. Manufacturer s and trading partners create and store their own serialised information about each and every product in their own local EPC-IS. The manufacturer manages and hosts a database that stores information about the generation of their products. Trading partners manages their local EPC-IS and store information about products movement through the supply chain. This local EPC-IS is accessible by all supply chain partners. Each involved partner makes this information available to authorised parties using the internet. 4. The Discovery service (DS) record incoming and outgoing product sand track products by using item-level tagging. DS functions as a key management server in which it generates public keys for System Administrator (SA) testing purposes. EPCglobal DS is equipped with a key management mechanism using a specific cryptography algorithm for public key encryption (RSA). It stores access control policies that comply with the role based access system. A role-based access control (RBAC) system has two phases in assigning privileges to an employee: first the employee is assigned one or more roles, and hen the role(s) are checked against the requested operation. 5. Supply Chain (SC) partner authentication is done through a certificate authority (CA) service using our trust framework. The partners that need to access the clone detector to provide their local certificate to the CA server installed in our trust framework.
6. The Object Naming Service (ONS) could be used to point to an address in the EPCglobal network where information about the product being questioned is stored. This service is important if a product need to be traced and tracked. 7. Item-level tagging is employed in our scenarios. 8. Attackers could be either from the organisation or outsiders.They are mainly 8 different points used by attacker to inject cloned and fraud in the SCM. a. An EPC lifecycle begins when a manufacturer tags a product. At the manufacturer's place, EPC tags are fixed to products. These EPC tags are furnished with codes and KILL/ACCESS passwords, upfront. b. A manufacturer records products information into the local EPC-IS. c. The EPC-IS registers EPC knowledge with EPC Discovery Services (DS). d. Before the product leaves the manufacturer's site, the product is fed into the cloning detector.
e. The result is sent to the manufacturer's local EPC-IS. If a cloned tag is detected, a trigger is sent to the manufacturer's SA. f. If not, the supplier is requested to move the product to the distributor's front door. g. At the front door, the distributor records the product into their local EPC-IS. h. The EPC-IS records with the EPC DS where tags are next fed into the cloning detector. i. If a clone is detected, the distributor's SA is triggered. The alarm log is kept in the DS. j.
The alarm log is sent to distributor's local EPC-IS. k. Before the products leaves the Distributor's site (at the back door), the RFID tags are fee into the cloning detector again to check for if there have been any cloning or fraudulent processes at the distributor site. l. Once confirmed as genuine tags, distributor sends the tagged products to the retailer site. The same process takes place at the retailer site. m. Any supply chain partner can access any other partner's EPC-IS for tracking and tracing purposes.
Testing process by system administrators
In this section we discuss how RFID tag cloning and fraud detection as well as cost modelling are supported by our proposed trust framework (Mahinderjit-Singh & Li, 2009; Mahinderjit-Singh & Li 2010) . In supply-chain-wide RFID systems, increasingly large data volumes are being exchanged, which in turn increases the risk for competitors to intercept this information (Gao et.al, 2004) . Trust relationships between supply chain suppliers and distributors curb cheap RFID tag cloning. RFID tag cloning and fraud detection can be detected in a supply chain at an initial stage if there is proper transfer of ownership with secure and authorised information exchange. We extend our proposed trust framework to establish a cloning and fraud detection system that has an integrated cost sensitive model. Our RFID detection system has three main components: collection; detection; and response. Collection is the component that collects a RFID event set E that is supplied by different supply chain partners. RFID event sets are then sent to the detection component where the information sources are analysed. Several detection functions are performed in this component, such as pattern matching; traffic or protocol analysis; finite state transition; etc. The response component notifies the system administrator where and when an intrusion takes place. Two types of roles, an attacker and a system administrator (SA), are considered in current IDSs and are defined below. Attackers attempt to gain unauthorised access to computer systems, tend to be malicious and possess a wide range of tools such as unauthorised RFID readers for performing the unethical acts of reading and manipulating genuine RFID tags to produce fake tags. Their behaviour is potentially harmful to the supply chain system. Almost 80% of attackers are the employees within a supply chain (P. Marcellin , 2009 ) System administrators (SAs) take charge of protecting the system and are minimising the costs of network management; system maintenance; and excessive use of resources. They are appointed and authorised to examine enterprise networks from attackers' perspectives, and use vulnerability testing tools that are the same as or similar to those used by hackers. Their objectives are to help an enterprise evaluate its security level, and identify the vulnerable elements that need to be repaired. Employment of layer 5 of our trust framework, the auditing module, supports the testing functions performed by SAs. Authentication and identification processes, applied through any authentication method or strong security protocol for identification purposes, begin prior to the SA accessing the system. After accessing the system, the SAs perform security tests and use testing techniques to identify malicious RFID tags. The security protocol concurrently calculates the key within the Discovery Service (DS) and matches it with any malicious RFID tag keys (a pre-shared secret managed by the SA). The tags are then sent to a cost based cloning detector for security testing. When the cloning detector finds a cloned tag, the alert system is triggered: First, the system tests for the existence of a secret key in the tag. If present, it treats it as a security-testing tag and executes the second step. If not, the tag is considered as cloned and the response component starts to inform the SA. In the second step, with the tag treated as a security testing tag, the validating algorithm is used to verify whether the shared and secret keys are identical. If they are identical, the response component does not generate an alarm to alert the SA, but logs the occurrence. If they are not identical, the security-testing tag is considered as a malicious attempt to forge the secret key. An alarm is generated to alert the SA to the attack of the protected system and suitable actions are taken to avoid system loss. Section 3 presents our proposed cost model.
Proposed cost model for RFID cloning detector
In this section, we discuss our proposed cost sensitive cost model and how we derived its algorithm. We use Bayes rule to forms the foundation of pattern recognition and embodies the definition of conditional probability. Bayes theorem is essentially an expression of conditional probabilities. More or less, conditional probabilities represent the probability of an event occurring given evidence. To better understand, Bayes Theorem can be derived from the joint probability of ci and x (i.e. P(ci,x)) as follows:
where P(ci|x) is referred to as the posterior; P(x|ci) is known as the likelihood, P(ci) is the prior and P(x) is generally the evidence and is used as a scaling factor. Therefore, it is handy to remember Bayes Rule as:
In practice, the same type of misclassification error may have different cost impacts depending on the object to be classified, contrary to the fixed misclassification cost approach, where costs remain constant regardless of the data to be classified. As a caveat, we have used US dollars (US$) as a measure when discussing the RFID domain, but these costs can be converted to some other meaningful unit of measure of utility that may be more appropriate for the IDS case.
where the is the misclassification cost function taking into account the properties of the data point x and is the test cost function taking into account the properties of the data point x
We examine the major costs factors associated with a SCM cloned tag detector, which include: misclassification cost due to successful intrusions initiated by attackers; Response Cost due to these intrusions; and the Testing costs associated with SA testing of authentication methods. We identify the following major cost factors associated to intrusion detection: Damage (OpCost) is the cost of processing the stream of events that are monitored by an IDS and of analyses of related activities, made available through the application of intrusion detection models. The detection outcome e is one of the following: false negative (FN); false positive (FP); true positive (TP); or true negative (TN). The costs associated with these outcomes (outlined in Table 3 ) are known as consequential costs (CCost), as they are incurred as a consequence of prediction. CCost is the cost summation of Damage and Response Costs. The terms used in our cost model are as following: Positive false detection rate Our proposed decision tree algorithm objective is in reducing misclassification cost for the cloned and fraud detection problem. Once the algorithm have achieved this objective, the cost model which calculates the total cost for cloning and fraud tags will be employed.A decision tree algorithm could be made cost sensitive by selecting those attributes that have highest gain at each stage of the tree building process (Ling et, al, 2006) . The gain is defined as:
priorCost = cost of misclassification before the split cCost = cost of misclassification after the split attribCost = cost of evaluating the attribute over which the split is taking place. N = number of instances.
where: n is the number of values that the attribute can take , N is the number of instances or RFID tags , D is the number of attributes, distj is the probability of class value j is the cost of misclassifying an instance of class j as that of class k, where k is the dominating class of the split. T is training dataset Given a distribution for c classes, the dominating class I for that node is calculated as follows:
We would not explain further on our proposed algorithm and its evaluation in this chapter and focus more on the cost model instead.
We can now define the cost model for the cloning detection system .When evaluating a system over some labelled test set E, where each event, e ∈ E, has a label of normal or one of the cloned , we define consequential cost ( CCost) and cumulative cost of the IDS as follows:
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TotalCost (e) = ∑ ∑ RcA(e)+ OcA(e)) (10)
DcA (e) ≥ Rc (e), e ∈ E'A (12) It may not always be possible to fold Damage and Response Costs into the same measurement unit. Instead, each should be analysed using its own relative scale. We must, however, compare and then combine these costs so that we can compute CCost(e) for use in the calculation of Cumulative Cost as shown in (2) and (3). Cost total is categorised in two parts:
• the total costs associated with attacks; and • the total cost associated with SA testing. Based on equations (7) and (8), N is the number of training datasets and T is the number of tags attacked. The overall total cost is calculated as a sum of all costs associated with all compromised RFID tags. In Table 4 and Table 5 extends the cost matrix outcome to predict the total cost of detection vs. non-detection of an attack vs. no attack. Table 4 shows the misclassification cost matrix for attackers and Table 5 displays the test cost matrix associated with the SA role. The explanations are discussed below.
Misclassification cost ( Cij)
Attack
No Attack Detection
RcA 
No detection OcS
TP Cost
If an attack occurs and the IDS detects it successfully, the associated cost is ((1−q1)) RcA + OcA. TP Cost is incurred in the event of a correctly classified cloned tag, and involves the cost of detecting the clone and possibly responding to it. To determine whether a response will be needed, RCost and DCost must be considered. If the Damage done by the attack to resource r is less than RCost, then ignoring the attack reduces the overall cost. Therefore, if RCost(e) > DCost(e), the intrusion is not responded to other than logging its occurrence, and the loss is DCost(e). If RCost(e) DCost(e), the intrusion is acted upon and the loss is limited to RCost(e). Because this state is the opposite state to a false negative detection, the detection rate can be derived as (1 − q1). OcA is the default cost if the IDS is settled and the RcA is generated because the IDS detects malicious tags.
FN Cost
FN Cost is the cost of not detecting a cloned attack. When the system falsely decides that a RFID tag is not cloned and does not respond to it, the attack will succeed, and the target resource will be Damaged. The FN Cost is therefore defined as the Damage Cost associated with the attacker (DcA ) or the Damage Cost associated with the system administrator DcS, related to event e. The expected cost in this scenario is q1 (DcA + OcA). OcA is the default cost if the IDS is settled and DcA occurs because the IDS fails to detect malicious packets. q1 is a negative false detection rate.
FP Cost
FP Cost is incurred when an event is incorrectly classified as an attack, i.e., when e = (normal, p, r) is misidentified as e' = ( a', p', r') for some attack a. If RCost(e'_) DCost(e'), a response will ensue and the Response Cost, RCost(e'), must be accounted for. In this instance, since normal activities may be disrupted due to an unnecessary response, a false alarm should be penalized. For our discussion, we use PCost(e) to represent the penalty cost of treating a legitimate event e as an intrusion. For example, if e is aborted, PCost(e) can be the Damage Cost of a DOS attack on resource r, because a legitimate user may be denied access to r. The expected cost in this state is q2(RcA + OcA + Pe). Because 'false positive detection' is a false detection the same as in case 2, the generated cost is expected to be Rcj + OcA. However, this scenario causes an additional penalty cost Pe due to a false response. q2 is a false negative detection rate.
TN cost
TN Cost is always 0, as it is incurred when a system correctly decides that an event is normal. This decision is therefore associated with no Damage Cost, as only Operating Cost for maintaining the IDS is required. Section 4 discusses how MCDM is used to quantify costs in our cost model. The detection algorithm that is embedded within the cost sensitive model is based on the description of our proposed cost matrix outcome as described earlier. 
Quantifying cloning and fraud cost using MCDM tool
In this section we use the MCDM approach in quantifying costs. For our purposes, we define decision making as the process of choosing among optional alternatives based on multiple criteria. For each of these decisions, we consider several factors or criteria and we also consider several optional alternatives. In group decision making these criteria and alternatives are more complex and must be determined prior to the development of related judgment scores or evaluation values. We adopted the simplest method for MCDM, using cross tabulation and weighting methods. The following equation describes how cross tabulation and weighting is represented:
where Zk(Oi) is the normalised score of option Oi under criterion Ck and w(Ck) is the normalised weighting for criterion Ck. The summation of the damage, response and operational costs will always be for the representation of ten tags for any conditions such as cloned, fraud or for the purpose of testing by SA. Section 4.1 discusses how MCDM is used to quantify cost for a RFID tag cloning attack. Section 4.2 describes the evaluation of the cost of a fraud attack.
MCDM for RFID tags cloning attack
This section introduces how costs associated with cloning attacks by attackers are quantified in a RFID system. Attacker Damage Cost (DcA) and attacker Response Cost (RcA) are the two costs discussed here. DcA is the amount of cost related to the Damage to target resources if intrusion detection is unavailable. Two main factors, criticality and lethality (Lindqvist & Jonsson, 2007) ; (Northcutt, 1999) are used to measure and define these costs. Criticality measures the importance of the targeted resource of an attack and evaluates it in terms of cost to replace, including unavailability and disclosure costs. For instance, the cost of replacing cloned RFID tags is much less than the cost of replacing the complete organisation database. DcA is a result of combining criticality with the attack category. Based on cost measurements factors and based on our problem definition, we use the simplest method of applying MCDM, using a cross table with target resources in RFID systems (tags, readers, database and RFID network) as criteria; and types of security cloning attacks as alternatives. 
Operational cost
Operational Cost (OcA) includes the default cost of running an IDS. This could include the amount of time and amount of computing resources needed to extract and test features from the raw data stream that is being monitored. In practice, OcA is associated with time. For instance, time should be minimised in the detection of a security problem and related generation of an alarm, as the longer the time taken, the higher the associated cost. There are two cost factors which need careful examining: 1) the computing resource cost per each of the four attack types); and 2) the time taken per attack type. To compute the computing resource related cost, the different events and transactions that occur in a supply chain need to be taken into account. Table 12 depicts the time taken to handle each attack type and Table 13 the test features, based on their computing resource related cost. It takes more time to handle a 'physical' attack than other attack types. This is because a 'physical' attack requires understanding of cryptanalysis techniques and is associated with a greater amount of laboratory work. We have analysed OcA related to the four different cloning attack types based on a typical RFID system in an integrated RFID EPCglobal service (Ranasinghe & Cole, 2007 , Verisign Inc, 2007 Test features look into the computing resources used in a counter measuring attack. 'Physical' attacks require more testing of raw features and are harder to counter than other attack types. In order to calculate Cumulative Cost or overall cost by using formula (3), the end result is based on two scenarios: The first scenario is the summation of CCost (Damage and Response Cost) with Operational Cost, relative to the cost of the time taken in handling the attacks. This is shown in Figure 15 . Based on Figure 7 , Cumulative Cost for a 'man in the middle' attack is the highest, followed by that for a 'physical' attack. 'Skimming' attacks have low overall costs because the attack requires less expertise and a lower Response Cost. We consider fraud attacks and SA testing damage (DcS) together since they have similar cost impact factors. In a real-time situation, a fraud attack is potentially in progress by the time it is detected, meaning that its measured Damage Cost at a point in time is potentially only a part of its total Damage Cost. This is represented by the formula 'Progress X Damage Cost', where attack progress is represented by the percentage of the attack's progress. We use the simpler 'skimming' attack cost ($11.80) obtained from Table 8 There is no reason to calculate Response Cost for SA testing, since SA testing is done using an upfront authentication mechanism and requires secure identification of a system administrator, thus preventing their injection of cloned or fraudulent tags in the system. Response Cost is thus associated only with fraud attacks, and not with SA tests. Table 17 shows the Response Cost for fraud attack and response cost used is similar to response to handle skimming attack. The amount of Response Cost is related to the number of affected tags. Operating cost for fraud attack will follows the similar formulation in section 4.2. Table 19 and Table 20 , compares both time taken in handling fraud and cloning and test features for fraud and cloning. Detection of fraud is much simpler than any cloning attack. This is because in practical and based on our theory, fraud tags will have identifiers which are not in the system. Thus simple similarity test is good enough to distinguish the EPC tags stored in the database. By using similar weight in cloning attack operational example in Cumulative Cost calculations for fraud attack are different based on two scenarios. In this scenario CCost is added to the relative cost of different test features for computing resource related cost and time taken in handling attack (as shown in Figure 20) . We have compared Cumulative Cost for both cloning and fraud attacks, and though the difference is not great, cloning attacks take up more operating time due to related countermeasures, which causes it to have a slightly greater cost. The operational cost for SA testing purposes will be a constant figure of 20.0, similar to operational cost to handle skimming attack. 
Progress of attacks| Attacks
Progress attack
Cost model calculation
This section contains an analysis of cost sensitive and cost insensitive models, and introduces a cost model input cost matrix for a detection system.Assuming that we have a cloned detection system that functions upfront, we could feed the cost matrix result in our cost model. Since our cost system is quantified using the MCDM tool and is based on the cost model calculation in Table 3 and Table 4 which are calculated using MCDM in section 4.1 and 4.3, we could list estimated Damage, Response and Operational Costs according to this cost model. The difference between a cost sensitive and cost insensitive model is that a cost sensitive method initiates a response if DCost ≥ RCost and corresponds to the cost model, whereas a cost insensitive method responds to every predicted intrusion and is representative of current brute-force approaches to intrusion detection. Table 21 displays the overall cost model calculation for a cloning attack and Table 22 displays the overall cost model calculation for a fraud attack. Table 23 shows the difference between cost sensitive and cost insensitive models for both cloning and fraud attacks. For instance, in a supply chain environment where both fraud and cloning are the act of counterfeiting, the total potential loss is estimated based on formula (1) in our model and is calculated to be US$1692.90. If this cost sensitive model is calculated for cloning attack for 'skimming attack ' for ten RFID tags, we will obtained a cost reduction of $US77.8 compare to cost insensitive model which gives us $US193.20. On average, the risk for our cost sensitive model on 'skimming attack' on each RFID tag over skimming attack will be estimated at $US7.80. Table 24 displays the cost of $US139 that should be bear by an organsation for every ten RFID tags tested. This testing cost is much lesser than 10% of the overall cost of counterfeiting and worth to be considered as well in any intrusion detection system. 
Cost types|
RFID tag prevention techniques using MCDM
In this section we apply Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) and MCDM approaches (for different units of range) to select optimal supply chain authentication techniques and RFID tag authenticity verification methods. AHP is a structured technique for dealing with complex decision making. AHP is a decision making tool that can describe a general decision making process by decomposing a complex problem into a multi-level hierarchical structure of objectives, criteria, sub criteria and alternatives, and is a well-known decision theory model developed by Saaty (1990) . Its primary attribute is quantifying relative priorities for a given set of alternatives on a ratio scale, based on the judgment of the decision-maker. It provides an easy way to incorporate multiple experts' opinions and control of consistency in judgments. In addition, the AHP method ensures high repeatability and scalability controls. Applications of AHP have been reported in numerous fields such as conflict resolution, project selection, budget allocation, transportation, health care, and manufacturing (Harker, 1989) . AHP determines the criteria weightings indirectly based on scores of relative importance for each in pair-wise comparisons. The comparison ratings are on a scale of 1 to 9, resulting in a ratio of importance for each pair with the maximum difference that one criterion is 9 times more important than another. A matrix of pair-wise comparisons is determined in this way (where Ci / Cj is just shorthand for the relative importance of Ci to Cj). In AHP, the final weightings for the criteria are the normalised values of the eigenvector that is associated with the maximum eigenvalue for this matrix. Saaty (1980) suggests that this procedure is the best way to minimise the impact of inconsistencies in the ratios. Consistency Ratio is a comparison between Consistency Index and Random Consistency Index, or, in formula:
We utilise the AHP tool in distinguishing the best approach and algorithm for preventing RFID tag cloning attacks in supply chains, and which is also suitable for use in testing processes used by SAs. In addition, we extend the MCDM tool based on criteria that best suit supply chain owners' needs when selecting RFID tag cloning and fraud prevention techniques. Among the defined criteria are acceptance, cost, security and complexity.
AHP tool for SA prevention techniques
In this section, we observe two different approaches. The first approach show the different methods used by SAs to handle authentications and select of algorithms. The second approach uses trust analysis based on tag cloning and fraud prevention techniques. The MCDM model can also be used in selecting the best tag cloning and fraud prevention approaches and the best approach for authentication that can be used by the System Administrator (SA) in testing the system. Authentication is an essential element of a typical security model. It is the process of confirming the identification of a user (or in some cases, a machine) that is trying to log on or access resources. While authentication verifies the user's identity, authorisation verifies that the user in question has the correct permissions and rights to access the requested resource. The two work together: Authentication occurs first, then authorisation. In a RFID enabled supply chain management tracking and tracing system website, authentication and authorisation are essential. Based on organisational role, role based access control can be employed in which the administrator at each site are responsible for their own site. For instance, an administrator is only able to view other supply chain partner reports and not able to edit or delete them. In an IDS system, one of the SA tasks are to monitor and maintain the availability and execution of the detection system. In addition, SAs are also responsible to test the system to ensure the IDS system is still relevant and able to detect cloned and fraud tags precisely. Thus, appropriate and secure modes of authentication approaches are required to ensure that the SA account is always protected. SAs can be authenticated by entering a password, inserting a smart card and entering the associated PIN, providing a fingerprint; voice pattern sample; retinal scan;, or using some other means to prove to the system that they are who they claim to be. Biometrics such as fingerprints, voice patterns or retinal scans are just a few of human traits known to be uniquely used in authentication. Biometric authentication is normally the most secure and the hardest to be compromised or cracked. Single Sign-On (SSO) is a feature that allows a user to use one password (or smart card) to authenticate to multiple servers on a network without re-entering credentials. IP Security (IPSec) provides a means for users to encrypt and/or sign messages that are sent across the network to guarantee confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity. IPSec transmissions can use a variety of authentication methods, including the Kerberos protocol or using public key certificates issued by a trusted certificate authority (CA). By using AHP approach, we have analysed the authentication alternatives against criteria such as processing time, cost, security and complexity. These criteria are the required validation factors for any authentication method . Table 25 shows an example on how to calculate overall weight for alternatives using AHP. The AHP model results as shown in Table 25 indicates that the biometrics method provides the most appropriate authentication mode in terms of security and minimal time in processing the public key fingerprint. Pair-wise comparison generally refers to any process of comparing entities in pairs to judge which entity is either preferred; or is found to have a greater amount of some quantitative property. The normalized principal Eigen vector is also called the priority vector. Since it is normalized, the sum of all the elements in priority vector is 1. The priority vector indicates the elements' relative weights. A comparison of the different authentication methods used by supply chain partners indicates the following authentication results: Sign on (38.08%); biometrics (41.74%) and IPSec (15.86%). Biometrics is most popular authentication method, followed by the sign on method. The Consistency Ratio of these figures is less than 10%, which is acceptable due to the subjective nature of the measurement factors. The subjective judgment needs to be revised if the Consistency Ratio is greater than 10%. in table 26 ). This is because SHA provides more strength of security compare to MD5 algorithm. However the disadvantage of the SHA algorithm is that it requires more storage space for its key management functionality.
Criterias
MCDM for tag's authenticy
The second part is an evaluation of different tag authentication methods through the use of various supply chain criteria, applying the MCDM approach (usage of ranking with different range). The supply chain criteria are selected based on the assumption that a supply chain company that is willing to spend minimal whilst still maintaining the appropriate security features standard for their low cost tags; and curbing both cloning and fraud attacks on their tags. The value of each row is either 1,2,3, 4 or 5 and represent the rank (shown in Table 27 ). Since smaller rank value is more preferable than higher rank value. Each factor has different importance weightings based on its organisation's priorities. Since the weighting is a subjective value, the result changes with changes to the factors' weightings. 
Applicability discussions
In this section, we analyze how well MCDM quantified costs associated with cloning and fraud attacks. In the first part we discuss on the MCDM quantified cost result for cloning attack. The second part discusses the cost results obtained for fraud attacks, and for SA tests and authentication exercises. Finally, we analyze the validity of using cost sensitive and cost insensitive models for costing purposes. greatest overall losses in terms of money, time and computing resources. This result implies that measures to prevent 'man in the middle 'cloning attacks in a supply chain management is likely to minimise the impact of counterfeiting on an organisation. The prevention measures that could be taken in eliminating MIM attacks include: 1) refresh the tag secret key immediately after a reader has been authenticated; 2) maintain tag output changes, as this minimises opportunities for replay attacks and the related risk of a faked tag; 3) keep the number of communication rounds and operation stages minimal to avoid redundant operations; maintain scalability and eliminate the risk of 'man in the middle; and 4) design the coordinating global item tracking server to include a timely tracking system that maintains freshness necessary due to the randomness of keys used in interorganisational item-tracking activities.
RFID Tag cloning attack
RFID tag fraud, SA testing and authentication techniques
The main differences between fraud and cloning attacks in regards to the similar Damage; response; and Operational Cost types, are based on the criteria factors used in applying a MCDM tool to calculate these costs. Fraud attack costs are associated with the progress of the attack rather than with the type of attack that contributed to it. This is due to the fact that a fraud attack occurs only after a tag has successfully been cloned after one or more previous attacks. The progress of a fraud attack is closely associated with inconsistency of tag count, related to the travel of tags to unauthorised locations:; the need for a higher bandwidth for fraud detection in unauthorised locations; and inconsistencies between travel timeframes associated with illegal tags. Similar criteria factors are used to calculate costs associated with SA testing. In a comparison of CCost for cloning and fraud attacks, the latter attack type has significantly lower associated CCost. This is due to the fact that fraud attacks are a part of cloning attack SA test costs are calculated using only Damage Cost, as SAs do not have malicious intentions towards the system and are able to use the system only after their system authentication, which is transparent during system audit procedures, classified as usage by a legal and authorised user. Biometric authentication methods are the most secure and suitable method for use by supply chain partners in supply chain management, as indicated by the AHP tool. The SHA algorithm can be used to create a 'fingerprint' for the public key of this biometric application. Tag authentication methods that minimise storage needs and use minimal key bits are preferred, such as lightweight public cryptography (e.g. ECC and lightweight protocol).
Cost sensitive vs. Cost insensitive
We have extended the MCDM tool for evaluating CCost (Damage and Response Costs) calculations in our cost model. The aim for calculating both Damage and Response Costs is the evaluation the cost impact of a cost sensitive vs. that of a cost insensitive cost model. The difference between the cost impact of a cost sensitive and cost insensitive model is that a cost sensitive model initiates an SA alert only if DCost ≥ RCost and if it corresponds to the cost model. Cost insensitive methods, in contrast, respond to every predicted intrusion and are demonstrated by current brute-force approaches to intrusion detection. Estimation of losses indicates that it could be reduced by up to 73% if a cost sensitive model is used in a system. This impressive result is obtained using quantified cost for counterfeiting; and indicate that to optimally curb both cloning and fraud attacks, it is necessary to aim to minimise false negative in a system rather than to optimise accuracy of detection and elimination of false positives. The underlying principle for every business model should remain to minimise financial losses without compromising system security or product quality. In addition our RFID cost model also included testing cost operated on the detector system by supply chain employee; the system administrator. The result display that testing cost only takes up less than 10% for every misclassifications cost reported. As the role of testing indicates the relevance of IDS and boost the accuracy of the dataset rules, the component of testing should never be compromised on the ground of losses in dollar. The result also indicates the significance of calculating both misclassification and testing cost in any cost model.
Conclusions and future research
In this chapter, we have proposed cost-based approach using MCDM tool to quantify cost when curbing counterfeiting in RFID-enabled SCM. We have extended this tool to analyze the different authentication approaches, including for tag authentication, which can be used by system administrators. We have shown that the MCDM approach could be used for implementing a practical cost-sensitive model, as validated by our analytical results. We contend that the definitions of damage; response; and operational costs are complex, especially when applying theoretical attack criticality and progress attack in determining cloning and fraud costs. Our future work will focus on the implementation of our cost model and on development of robust RFID tag detectors for cloning and fraud attacks. We will use the cost model to estimate costs to predict total financial losses related to RFID tag cloning and fraud.
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